Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 30
Issue 1 January 1997

Article 3

1997

Women's Rights in International Law
Valerle A. Dormady

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Valerle A. Dormady, Women's Rights in International Law, 30 Vanderbilt Law Review 97 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol30/iss1/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Women's Rights in International Law:
A Prediction Concerning the Legal
Impact of the United Nations' Fourth
World Conference on Women
ABSTRACT

This Note contains a detailed review of state responses
to the Platformfor Action produced at the United Nations'
Fourth World Conference on Women. The Author finds that
this consensus was reached on most of the proposals
outlined in the Platform for Action.
Certain proposals,
however, regardingreproductive and Inheritance issues, were
subject to a great deal of dispute during the drafting of the
Plafformfor Action, and many countries ultimately registered
reservationsas to these proposals. While the news reports of
the Fourth World Conference on Women focused on the

lobbying activities of both Islamic countries and Catholic
countries, particularly the Vatican,

this Note finds

that

ultimately most of the damage done to consensus on these
controversialproposals was caused by the Islamic countries.
This group of countries' objections to the controversial
proposals were based in religious and cultural beliefs. The
Author analyzes the patternof reservationsto the Platformfor
Action according to a set offactors designed to help predict
the legal result of non-binding internationalconferences. On
the basis of this analysis, this Note predicts that, while the
number of objecting states was small relative to the whole, on
the basis of the way customary international law is
developed, the existence of this one highly interestedgroup of
states opposing some proposals will likely stall the further
development of these proposals as legal norms for the
foreseeable future. For the rest of the proposals in the
Platform, which were subject to a great deal of consensus,
adoption of these proposals at the Conference should
enhance their development into customary international law
norms. None of the proposals will develop into law, however,
absent state practice at this time, and this Notefinds that this
required state practice is not at all assured, based upon
states' actions sofar.
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FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCEON WOMEN
I. INTRODUCTION

Amid fanfare and controversy, the United Nations' Fourth
World Conference on Women (hereinafter Conference) convened in
Beijing, China, on September 4, 1995.1 The event attracted
25,000 registered delegates 2 from 190 countries. 3 Over 36,000
additional people 4 attended a related meeting of nongovernmental organizations in nearby Huairou, China, between
August 30 and September 8, 1995. The Conference ended on
September 15, 1995, with all attending states approving the

adoption of the Conference's final document, the Platform for
Action and Beijing Declaration (hereinafter Platform). Although
the objectives stated in the Platform are not binding legal
obligations of the participating states, the Platform is to serve as a
guideline for the development of women's human rights. One and
one-half years later, the import of the Conference remains
unclear. Ultimately, what impact, if any, will the Conference have
on international law regarding women's rights? Are any portions
of the Platform likely to result in new international legal norms
relating to women? Using a framework of predictors about the
legal impact of such conferences, this Note attempts to answer
these questions.
Part II of this Note discusses the Conference and the contents
of the Platform, indicating which countries made interpretive
statements or stated reservations to various sections of the
Platform. Part III analyzes the level of state support for the
proposals expressed in the Platform and applies a predictive
analytical framework to the information from and regarding the
Conference. Based on the results of this analysis, Part IV predicts
the ultimate legal impact of the Conference. This Note finds that
international consensus was strong for most sections of the
Platform. Given state practice, the proposals contained in these
widely supported sections should attain the status of law more
quickly as a result of their endorsement at a multilateral forum.
Opposition to the contested proposals in the Platform, however,

1.
Gayle Reaves, Barriers to Bejing; Organizers Struggle to Keep U.N.
Women's Conference on Track Amid Last-Minute Snags. DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Aug. 28, 1995, at IA.

2.
Dr. James Dobson Charges Clinton Administration with Betraying
American Families in Beijing, PR Newswlre Association, Inc., Oct. 2, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File; Joan Chittister & Tom Fox, Amid
High Hopes, U.N. and NGOs Aim to Create New Generation of Women. NAT'L
CATHOLIC REP., Sept. 15, 1995, at 11, available in 1995 WL 12420761.
3.
Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, at 138, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 177/20 (1995) [hereinafter Conference Report].
4.
Pamela Burdman, At Last Women Gather in China; 36,000 Expectedfor
Grass-Roots ForumBeset by Controversy, S. F. CHRON., Aug. 30, 1995, at Al.

100

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 30:97

was strong. News reports of the Conference emphasized the role
that Catholic and Islamic countries played in opposing aspects of
the Platform. As the analysis of this Note shows, however, most
of the damage done to consensus on the Platform provisions was
done by the Islamic countries. The contingent of countries that
opposed the controversial provisions is likely to remain stalwart in
its objections. On the basis of the predictive factors reviewed in
Part II, this Note concludes that these controversial proposals are
not likely to become international legal norms soon.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Beiing Conference

There have been three previous U.N.-sponsored conferences
on women's rights, the most recent of which was held in Nairobi
in 1985. 5 One of the goals of the Fourth World Conference on
Women in Beijing was to follow up on the progress that had been
made by the world community on the "Forward Looking
by the Nairobi Conference in the decade since
Strategies" drafted
6
meeting.
that
However, the heart of the activity and effort at the Beijing
Conference was the articulation of its own goals for the future.
During the twelve days of the Conference, delegates negotiated
and drafted the main Conference document-the Platform. The
Platform focused generally upon the economic and personal
empowerment of women. 7 Extensive negotiations went into the
drafting of the Platform, and its provisions regarding some
subjects were decided only after heated debate among the
delegates. 8 Many nations stated or recorded "reservations" to the
controversial portions of the Platform, thereby indicating their
lack of acceptance of those sections. 9 Most of those dissenting
countries had strong Christian, particularly Roman Catholic,
and/or Islamic traditions,1 0 and their dissents arose from moral
beliefs based in their respective religions.

Chittlster & Fox, supra note 2.
5.
Id.
6.
Key PolntsfromWomen's Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15. 1995, at A3.
7.
Loretta Tofani, Forum'sPlanforImproving Women's Lot Not Approved by
8.
All, Knight-Ridder News Service, Sept. 16, 1995.
Id.
9.
Id.
10.
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1. Contents of the Platform for Action
The Platform was adopted by resolution of the national
delegates to the Conference on September 15, 1995.11
It
identified twelve critical areas of concern for women: 12 (1) women
and poverty;' 3 (2) education and training of women; 14 (3) women
and health; 15 (4) violence against women; 16 (5) women and armed
conflict; 17 (6) women and the economy;' 8 (7) women in power and
decision-making; 19
(8) institutional mechanisms
for
the
21
advancement of women; 20 (9) the human rights of women; (10)
women and the media;2 2 (11) women and the environment;2 3 and
(12) issues surrounding the female child. 2 4 Thus the topics that
the Platform covered were varied, including educational, health,
and economic issues. In general, the Platform focused on the
issue of power and control in these many areas and called for the
direction of greater resources to women and girls. The Platform
stated objectives and proposed governmental action for all twelve
25
areas.
2. Debate Over the Platform Objectives
The scope of the Platform was broad, and prior to the
Conference, fully 50% of the draft Platform was under objection
by one member state or another. 2 6 During the drafting that took
place at the Conference, the fiercest debates arose surrounding
the provisions of the section on women and health (hereinafter
"Health section")27 and language condemning discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. 28
The language on sexual

11.
12.

Conference Report, supra note 3, at 157.
Id. at 19.

13.

Id. at 21.

14.
Id. at 29.
15.
Id. at 37.
16.
Id. at 51.
17.
Id. at 59.
18.
Id. at 68.
19.
Id. at 82.
20.
Id. at 87.
21.
Id. at 92.
22.
Id. at 102.
23.
Id. at 106.
24.
Id. at 112.
25.
See generally Id.at 19-121.
26.
Rone Tempest. Fight Brewed Before Being Conference, but it Never
Percolated,L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9. 1995, at A18.
27.
Id.; see also Tiffany Bown, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 14, 1995,
availableIn 1995 WL 7856342.
28.
Tempest. supranote 26, at A18.
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orientation was eventually dropped from the document under firm

pressure from the Vatican and the Islamic states.29
In spite of the debate on these key areas, however, apparently
much of the Platform was subject to consensus by the attending

delegations since no serious debates were reported during the
drafting of most of the Platform sections.3 0 Additionally, of the
reservations and consensus-damaging interpretive statements
made by states after the adoption of the Platform, most were
focused squarely on the limited areas that were subject to debate
31
during the Conference.
3. Reservations and Statements Made About the Platform
At the final meeting of the Conference, at which the Platform
was adopted, several governments' delegates made oral
statements about the Platform. 3 2 Some of these statements were
general in nature, while others were interpretive of specific
provisions of the Platform. Additionally, a number of states
33
expressed reservations about certain aspects of the Platform.
a. Reservations and Interpretive Statements of the United States
The United States, a Western state with a progressive
approach toward women's issues, was an important presence at
the Conference and a key supporter of the Platform. 34 In spite of
this fact, the United States recorded interpretive statements or
reservations to twenty-three paragraphs of the Platform, more

29.
30.
31.
(including

Id.
See generally Id.; see also Bown, supra note 27.
Most reservations were made regarding aspects of the Health section
paragraphs 94-96, 106(j). 106(k), and 232(f)). See Infra note 109.

32.
Conference Report, supra note 3, at 157.
33.
Tempest, supra note 26. For the purposes of this Note, Interpretive
statements and reservations will be called "objections," although Interpretive
statements are not all negative in nature or effect. See infra text accompanying
infra notes 144-48 (illustrating that some interpretive statements do not

undermine the paragraph to which they are directed.)
34.
See Jim Landers, U.S. Women Push 'Progressive'Agenda, Conservatives
Attack Detesstion's Planfor U.N. Conference in China, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug.
25, 1995, at 18 (quoting a U.S. official as saying that, "U.S. participation in
previous U.N. conferences was largely responsible for declarations supporting
human rights," and that, "[ifthe United States were not to go to Beijing ... the
very progressive spirit and progressive voice of these conferences and of these
ideas would not be heard[;]" see also Tempest, supra note 26 (noting that the

Vatican and the United States led "opposite camps" at the Conference.).
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than any other state except the Vatican.3 5 However, of that
36
number, the United States recorded only one actual reservation,
and this reservation did not directly implicate any potential legal
norms regarding women's rights that might spring from the

Conference.

Furthermore,

this U.S.

reservation

did

not

undermine any principle underlying the objectives articulated in
the Platform. In addition, the eleven interpretive statements of
the United States were all of such a nature that they either (1) did
not undercut the provision they addressed,3 7 or (2) did not

address an issue that implicated women's issues (but instead
gender-neutral concerns that impact women
addressed broader
38
as well as men).
Although the United States' reservations and interpretations
did not affect any provision specifically implicating women's rights
norms, its comments did tend to undercut the necessary forwardlooking commitment to implementation of the Platform objectives.
The United States stated that the Platform is merely a set "of
recommendations" and that its commitment to implement the
Platform was not "a specific commitment to implement each
element of the Platform[,]" but rather, was a generalized
commitment to the Platform overall.3 9 Although the impact of
this language is not fully clear, a commitment to implement each
element of the Platform would have been a stronger showing of
support than the language cited above. Implementation of the

35.
See generally Conference Report, supra note 3, at 157-77 (listing the
reservations and interpretive statements recorded by the United States and all
other states).
36.
The United States reserved its position as to paragraph 5, regarding
commitment of resources. Id. at 173.
See td. at 174-76 (noting the interpretive statements of the United
37.
States regarding the following paragraphs: 17 ("radical transformation of the
relationship between women and men" interpreted to mean "realization of full
equality between women and men"); 26 (supporting the commitment to facilitate
NGO work); 46 (stating that the omission of reference to discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation in the Platform does not justify such discrimination in

any country); 96 (assuming that the paragraph applies existing norms of human
rights law to the issue of equal relationships between men and women); 166()
("equal remuneration for men and women for work of equal value" interpreted to
mean "equal pay for equal work"); 206(b)(e) & (f) (promising to develop better
knowledge about unwaged work); 234-45 (stating that references to media actions
are understood as suggestions that may not impinge on the freedom of the press);
293 (interpreting the word "require" consistent with the fact that the Conference
is not binding); 353 (reiterating that the United States does not have an "agreed
target" for official development assistance)).
38.
See id. at 174-75 (noting the interpretive statements of the United
States regarding paragraphs 131 (discussing the issue of foreign occupation as a
human rights violation per se); and 247 (regarding environmental degradation
and nuclear weaponry)).
39.
Id. at 173.
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Platform would lead to the state practice that will be crucial to the
development of the proposals as legal norms.
However, this lesser commitment by the United States almost
certainly did not reflect any disagreement with the underlying
principles of the disputed provisions, since these principles are in

accordance with the prevailing U.S. cultural values. As stated
above, the U.S. delegation was a strong advocate of the Platform

objectives. 40
More likely, this language reflected a lack of
willingness on the part of the United States to commit financial
resources 4to
the implementation of the extensive Platform
1
provisions.
The objections made by the United States did not fit the
pattern of the rest of the objecting countries. The United States
consistently objected to the Platform's language regarding
commitment of financial resources,4 2 but it was a staunch
supporter of all of the Platform goals in the abstract. 43 For these
reasons, the reservations and interpretive statements of the
United States will be excluded from the discussion below
regarding reservations made by other states, but the impact of the
United States' reluctance to commit resources will be discussed in
the final analysis of this Note.
b.
Reservations and Interpretive Statements of All Other
Countries
The rest of the countries that had objections to the Platform
were mostly concerned with portions of the Health section. Of the
Platform paragraphs that had multiple reservations and
interpretive statements made against them, only one-paragraph
274(d), regarding equal inheritance rights for women-fell outside
44
the Health section.

(1) Total Number of Reservations Made

In total, sixty-five states made oral statements or orally

4 5 This total
expressed reservations about aspects of the Platform.

40.
See supra text accompanying note 34.
41.
Bolstering this interpretation is the United States' explicit reluctance to
commit resources to implementation. See supra text accompanying note 39.
42.
See Conference Report, supra note 3. at 173-75 (including statements
of the United States that the Platform is not legally binding, and that the United
States did not agree to a 'target' for official development assistance).
43.
See supra note 34.
44.
See Infra note 109.
45.
Conference Report. supra note 3, at 157. Many countries requested
that their statements be recorded in the Conference Report, but many others did
not. Therefore, while the Conference Report lists all of the countries that made
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amounted to roughly one-third of the participating states. Many
of these statements, however, were neutral or affirmative in
nature. In fact, the statements of twenty-eight countries did not
negatively impact consensus on any part of the Platform.4 6

statements at the final meeting of the Conference, see Infra note 109, it does not
contain the text of some countries' statements. For those countries whose
statements were not recorded, the United Nations press release regarding the last

meeting is used in this Note as the source of those countries' statements. The
press release includes all of the oral statements made by countries on that day.
See United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women Press Release,
WOM/BEI/38, Sept. 15, 1995 [hereinafter Press Release 381.
A review of the Conference Report and Press Release 38 reveals that
apparently some paragraph numbers changed between the time of the last
meeting and the printing of the Conference Report. Compare Press Release 38,
supra at 4 (Kuwait listed as reserving its position as to paragraphs 107(k), 96, and
97) with Conference Report, supra note 3, at 167 (Kuwait listed as reserving its
position as to paragraphs 106(k) and 94 to 96); Conference Report, supra note 3.
at 169 with Press Release 38, supra at 5 (Malaysia listed as reserving its position
as to paragraphs 107(k) and 109(k) in Press Release 38 but paragraphs 106(k)
and 108(k) listed in the Conference Report); Conference Report, supra note 3, at
166 with Press Release 38, supra at 5 (paragraphs 97 and 231(f) listed by Iran in
Press Release 38 but paragraphs 96 and 232(f) listed in the Conference Report).
For the purposes of this Note, the text of the official Conference Report, and the
paragraph references contained therein, will control, and all analysis is based
upon the paragraph numbers--and the corresponding paragraphs--cited in the
Conference Report.
In accordance with this scheme, all references to paragraph 231(f) in Press
Release 38 have been interpreted to refer to paragraph 232(f); all references to
paragraph 97 have been interpreted to refer to paragraph 96; all references to
paragraph 107(k) have been interpreted to refer to paragraph 106(k); and all
references to paragraph 109(k) have been interpreted to refer to paragraph 108(k).
Additionally, the reference by Djibouti in Press Release 38 to paragraphs 95-97
have been interpreted to refer to paragraphs 94-96.
Such an interpretation makes sense in that it brings Djibouti and all of the
other Muslim countries that objected to paragraph 97 (according to the press
release) into accordance with all of the other Muslim countries listed in the
Conference Report, all of which objected to some or all of paragraphs 94-96, but
none of which mentioned paragraph 97. Additionally, it is corroborated by the
recurring, identical discrepancies between the paragraph numbers listed in the
oral statements found in Press Release 38 and those listed (for countries who had
their statements recorded) in the Conference Report.
46.
Twenty-one countries made completely neutral or affirmative
statements regarding potential norms involving women's rights: France, Costa

Rica, Guatemala, India, Ethiopia, Bolivia, Colombia, Bangladesh, Ghana,
Cambodia, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Brazil, Panama, El
Salvador, Madagascar, Chad, Cameroon, Vanuatu, and Gabon, see generally,
Press Release 38, supra note 45, and Canada, see Fiona Muldrew, Women Still
Hold Up Half the Bruised Sky (FeministActivlb in Canada), CANADIAN DIMENSION,
Feb. 12, 1996, at 13, availablein 1996 WL 9252071.
Another seven countries made statements that were either neutral or
affirmative, but which included a reiteration of their stance against abortion:
Ecuador, Argentina, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Honduras, the Philippines, see Press
Release 38, supra note 45, at 5-10, 11, and the Dominican Republic, see
Conference Report, supra note 3, at 159. This did not impact any potential norms
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comments

or

reservations that were consensus-damaging on one or more
points. 4 7
States with predominantly Muslim populations
represented the main block of countries objecting to portions of
the Platform. Twenty-four states with a strong connection to
Islam made consensus-damaging interpretive statements or
expressed reservations to the Platform. 48 This block of Muslim

states represented almost thirteen percent of the total number of

states participating in the Conference.

Additionally, tvo more

countries with a mix of strong Roman Catholic and Islamic
49
influences expressed reservations to portions of the Platform.
States whose religion is dominated by Roman Catholicism,
including the Vatican, represented the other main block of
countries5 0 -mainly Latin American-who were outspoken in the
debates during the drafting of the Platform and who made
statements after the Conference. Of those states, however, only
three5 l actually made consensus-damaging statements. Many of

arising from the Conference since a right to obtain a legal abortion was not
asserted in the Platform. See Infra note 54.
47.
Those states were: Central African Republic, Kuwait, Egypt, the Holy
See, Malaysia, Iran, Libya, Indonesia, Mauritania, Oman, Malta, Peru, Brunei
Darussalam, Yemen, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Lebanon,
Tunisia, Mall, Benin, Algeria, Iraq, Morocco, Djibouti, Qatar, Togo, Liberia, Syria,
Pakistan, Nigeria, Comoros, Jordan, Maldives, and Niger, see generally Press
Release 38, supra note 45, and Paraguay and the United States, see Conference
Report, supra note 3, at 170 and 173.
48.
Those countries were: Algeria, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Comoros,
Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Maldives,
Mali. Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Sudan, Syrian Arab
Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. See Conference Report,
supra note 3, at 157, for a listing of the countries that made oral statements and
reservations, and OUR SUNDAYS VISITORS 1996 CATHOLIC ALMANAC 333-67 (Feliclan
A. Foy, O.F.M., Rose M.Avato, eds.) (1996) (hereinafter 1996 CATHOLIC ALMANAC)
for a list of the religious affiliations of the countries of the world.
49.
Lebanon and Nigeria. See Press Release 38, supra note 45, at 8, 10
(reporting the statements of these countries); see also 1996 CATHOLIC ALMANAC,
supra note 48, at 333-67 (listing the religious affiliations of these countries).
50.
That block of countries included: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, the Holy See,
Honduras, Malta, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, and Venezuela. See
Conference Report, supranote 3, at 157 (listing all of the countries that made oral
statements of interpretation and reservations.) At least 84% of the citizens of all
of these countries are Catholic. See 1996 CATHOLIC ALMANAC, supra note 48, at
333-67 (listing the religious affiliations of the countries of the world.)
51.
The Holy See reserved its position to the entire Health section of the
Platform and Paraguay included language in its statement that undercut
paragraph 94, interpreting it "in conformity with its national legislation."
Conference Report, supra note 3, at 163, 171. Peru Included language in its oral
statement that seemed to undercut paragraph 94 also.
Peru stated that
"[c]oncepts on reproductive health and rights cannot be used to regulate fertility
or family planning." Press Release 38, supra note 45, at 6.
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Catholic states eventually supported the Platform in
the 5Roman
full. 2 The rest supported the Platform, but made statements
reiterating their opposition to abortion. 53 The Platform does not
actually propose or endorse a right to obtain a legal abortion,
did not impact consensus for any of
however, so those statements
54
the Platform proposals.

(2) Reservations and Interpretive Statements Made Against the
Health Section

The parts of the Health section that drew reservations and
interpretive statements were: paragraph 94, regarding access to
family planning methods;5 5 paragraph 95, regarding the right to
decide family planning matters;5 6 paragraph 96, regarding the

Those Roman Catholic states were: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa
52.
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Panama. See generally Press Release 38.
supranote 45.
53.
Those Roman Catholic states were: Ecuador, Argentina, Venezuela,
Nicaragua, Malta, the Philippines, and Honduras, see generally Press Release 38,
supranote 45, at 4, 6-9, 11, and the Dominican Republic, see Conference Report,
supranote 3, at 159.
54.
The Conference Report deals with the issue of abortion in paragraphs
106(j) and 106(k). Those paragraphs deal with the health impact of unsafe
abortion and suggest that countries may consider reviewing laws that punish
women for undergoing illegal abortions. See Conference Report, supra note 3, at
43. The language of the paragraphs leaves the determination of this issue to the
individual states, stipulating that "[alny measures or changes related to abortion
within the health system can only be determined at the national or local level
according to the national legislative process." Id. These two paragraphs cannot
be read as asserting that a right to obtain a legal abortion is an international
human right; at most, they advocate only weakly for a domestic legal right to
obtain an abortion. Therefore, any language generally reiterating a country's
stance against allowing legal abortions would not implicate any norm proposed by
the language of the Platform.
55.
See Infra note 159 (listing the states that objected to paragraph 94.)
Paragraph 94 reads:
Reproductive health is a state of complete physical, mental and social

well-being and note merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all
matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and
processes. Reproductive health therefore implies that people are able to
have a satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capability to
reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when, and how often to do so.
Implicit in this last condition are the right of men and women to be
informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable
methods of family planning of their choice, as well as other methods of
their choice for regulation of fertility which are not against the law.
Id. at 38.
See infra note 160 (listing the states that objected to paragraph 95.)
56.
Paragraph 95 reads in pertinent part:

108
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right to decide sexual and reproductive matters free of coercion,
discrimination, or violence; 5 7 paragraph 1060), regarding the
health impact of unsafe abortions; 58 paragraph 106(k), calling for
safe abortions in states where they are not illegal, and calling for
the repeal of punitive measures against women who have had
abortions;5 9 and paragraph 232(f), which calls for the
implementation of the objectives stated in paragraphs 94 through
96.60

[Reproductive rights] rest on the recognition of the basic right of all
couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number,
spacing and timing of their children and to have the information and
means to do so, and the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and
reproductive health. It also includes their right to make decisions
concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and violence, as
expressed in human rights documents.
Id. at 39.
57.
See Infra text accompanying notes 150-51 (listing the states that
objected to paragraph 96.) Paragraph 96 reads:
The human rights of women include their right to have control over and
decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality.
including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination
and violence.
Equal relationships between women and men in matters of sexual
relations and reproduction, including full respect for the integrity of the
person, require mutual respect, consent and shared responsibility for
sexual behavior and its consequences.
Id. at 39.
58.
See Infra note 161 (listing the states that objected to paragraph 106(J).)
Paragraph 106(J) reads: "[Governments should r]ecognize and deal with the
health impact of unsafe abortion as a major public health concern, as agreed in
paragraph 8.25 of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on
Population and Development." Conference Report, supra note 3, at 43.
59.
See infra note 162 (listing the states that objected to paragraph
106(k).) Paragraph 106(k) reads:
Women who have unwanted pregnancies should have ready access to
reliable information and compassionate counseling. Any measures or
changes related to abortion within the health system can only be
determined at the national or local level according to the national
legislative process. In circumstances where abortion is not against the
law, such abortion should be safe. In all cases, women should have
access to quality services for the management of complications arising
from abortion. Post-abortion counseling, education and family-planning
services should be offered promptly, which will also help to avoid repeat
abortions. [States should] consider reviewing laws containing punitive
measures against women who have undergone illegal abortions.
Id. at 43.
60.
See Infra note 163 (listing the states that objected to paragraph 232(t).
Paragraph 232(fM reads: "[Governments should:] Take action to ensure that the
human rights of women, including the rights referred to in paragraphs 94 to 96
above, are fully respected and protected." Id. at 100.
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(3) Reservations and Interpretive Statements
Paragraph 274, Regarding Inheritance Rights

Made Against

Besides the provisions of the Health section, multiple states
sounded reservations and interpretations regarding the Platform
provisions involving inheritance and sovereignty issues.
Paragraph 274(d) of the Platform calls for states to enact and
enforce legislation that guarantees equal rights of succession
regardless of gender. 6 1 Nine Muslim states made reservations or
damaging interpretations on the topic of inheritance, and six
additional Muslim states made blanket reservations against any
provisions of the Platform in contravention of the Islamic
Shariah. 62 The Shariah is the body of Islamic religious law6 3 and
forms the basis of many Islamic states' legal systems.6 4 The
inheritance guidelines of paragraph 274(d) contradict the
provisions of the Shariah, which under some interpretations
provides that women receive just half of the inheritance share of a
man who is to the same degree related to the decedent.6 5
(4) Statements Made Regarding Sovereignty
Finally, multiple states made comments reiterating the
sovereignty of the state in regulating its domestic affairs. 66 All of

61.

Paragraph 274(d) reads:

Eliminate the injustice and obstacles in relation to inheritance faced by
the girl child so that all children may enjoy their rights without
discrimination, by, inter alia, enacting, as appropriate, and enforcing
legislation that guarantees equal right to succession and ensures equal
right to inherit, regardless of the sex of the child[.]
Id. at 115.
62.
See Infra note 164 (detailing the objections to paragraph 274(d)).
63.
7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 431, 431 (1993).
64.
Id.
65.
Adrien K. Wing, Custom, Religion, and Rights; the FutureLegal Status of
PalestinianWomen, 35 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 149, 158-59 (1994). Interpretations of the
Shariah may vary between schools of Islamic law. See Infra text accompanying
note 127. This fact may in turn vary womens" inheritance rights according to the
dominant interpretation within the area. However, It is clear that the Quran itself
does stipulate fixed shares of the estate be awarded to female relatives, with the
residue going to male relatives. Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States
and the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women: Are the Sharl'a and the Convention Compatible? 44 AM. U. L. REv.
1949, 1967 (1995). This in itself may be inconsistent with the equality in
succession laws called for by the Platform.
66.
See generally Conference Report, supra note 3, at 157-77 (containing
comments by Egypt (stating that Egypt's compliance is conditional upon respect
for the rights of national sovereignty and moral and religious values), Guatemala
(noting its sovereign right to implement the Platform in accordance with its
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these comments came from states with a strong Roman Catholic

or Muslim influence that were apparently concerned about the
effect of international pressure on their cultural norms and
heritage.
Because these comments do not specifically identify which
provisions, if any, the state may not implement in light of its
sovereign rights, they do not undermine consensus as established
67
at the Conference for any particular provision or provisions.
B. The Creationof Customary InternationalLaw
Customary international law has traditionally evolved as a
result of state practice. 68 Under this construct, states help to
create international law through their actions, and once enough
states follow a practice for it to be considered an obligatory norm,
it becomes binding international law.6 9
Acceptance by all
individual states has not traditionally 7been
necessary for an
0
international practice to develop into law.
International law continues to develop in this traditional way,
but multilateral forums increasingly play a role in the shaping
development of customary international law.7 1
Consensus
evidenced by agreement at an international forum can ultimately

be evidence of a binding legal obligation, combined with other

Constitution), Libya (stating that it does not accept the right of any nation or
civilization to impose its cultural, political, etc., orientations on another nation),
and Peru (agreeing with the Platform to the extent that it Is in accord with Peru's
Constitution)); see also Press Release 38, supra note 47, at 7-12 (containing
comments of the Dominican Republic (stating it will implement the Platform to
the extent that it is in accord with Its constitution and laws), Vanuatu (noting that
it endorsed the Platform "with full respect for [Vanuatu's] constitutional, legal and
religious principles"), Djibouti (noting that the Platform "will be dealt with in the
context of national sovereignty of Djibouti"), and Palestine (stating that it will
control" its own "destinlyl" regarding womens' Issues.)).
67.
However, these comments may be indicative of a lack of commitment
to implement some Conference provisions, which would diminish the state
practice necessary to move the proposals toward the status of international law.
68.
The position of customary international law on an Issue was
determined by looking at what states had done in the past regarding that issue.
Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Dfferent Drummer: The Principleof the Persistent
Objector in InternationalLaw, 26 HARV. INT'L L. J. 457, 465 (1985).
69.
Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
529, 536 (1993).
70.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] § 102 cmt. b (1987).
Once the norm Is
considered by the international community to be international law, individual
states that may not have been part of developing the norm and that do not
individually accept the norm as law may be bound by it anyhow. Charney, supra
note 69, at 536.
71.
Charney, supra note 69, at 543; see also Stein, supra note 68, at 46366 (discussing the trend toward "conscious" law creation.).
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forms of evidence. 72 If solutions proposed and widely accepted at
an international forum are also manifested in practice by the
international
community
(as
exhibited
by
domestic
implementation of the solution or other shows of support), they
will quickly become international law, regardless of their legal
status as they emerged from the multinational forum. 73 Thus,
although a solution proposed at an international forum, such as
the Conference, may not be binding as international law, having
come out of such a forum lends legitimacy to the solution
and
74
adds impetus to its development into international law.
It is clear from the construct described above that a
determination of the legal impact of the Conference will turn on
whether the objectives of the Conference were endorsed by the
nation-participants. 75
A reading of the news reports of the
Conference, as well as the reservations and statements made by
the states, makes clear that some provisions of the Platform were
endorsed, but others were not.
1. Potential International Legal Norms that were Endorsed at the
Conference
The Platform contained many objectives, stated in normative
terms, that were candidates for becoming international human
rights norms. Most of these objectives were approved by all states
without any debate. Although all of the potential norms that
received full endorsement by the Conference are too numerous to
list, an examination of the Platform reveals many potential
candidates within the fully-endorsed sections of the Platform,
such as:

72.

According

to this rationale,

the

adoption

of a

proposal at

a

multinational conference is actually a form of state practice that becomes
evidence of customary international law in that area. See RESTATEMENT, supra
note 70. § 102 n.2 ( "The practice of states that builds customary law takes many
forms and includes what states do in or through international organizations[;]...
statements and votes of governments are kinds of state practice.").
73.
Charney, supra note 69, at 545.
74.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, at § 103 cmt. c ("Resolution of
universal international organizations, if not controversial and if adopted by
consensus or virtual unanimity, are given substantial weight" as evidence of

intemational law.).
75.

Of course, state domestic practice and other forms of evidence could

independently form the basis of new customary international law on any of the

topics covered in the Platform, but as a practical matter it is clear that states will
not implement that which they did not even support in theory as part of the
Platform.
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The right of women to equal access to society's
1.
resources-for example, to health care, 7 6 or to
education; 77 and,
The right of women to be free from violence,
2.
different types of violence that are specific to
including
78
women.
No nations objected to any of the paragraphs setting forth
these rights. 79 This lack of objection amounts to consent to the
Therefore, this general endorsement from the
proposals.8 0
Conference, a multinational forum, should help to develop the law
regarding these issues. Additional evidence of approval in the
form of state practice would accelerate the movement of the

potential norms toward the status of law.
Other paragraphs that could give rise to international norms,
however, were the subject of objections by many nations. As
noted above, seven paragraphs of the Platform drew objections by
multiple states. 8 t Those paragraphs broadly represent three
potential international human rights norms:
and sexual
The right of all persons to reproductive
1.
82
rights");
"reproductive
(hereinafter
freedom

76.
Such a norm may be derived from paragraph 89, which states that
"[women have the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health." Conference Report, supra note 3, at 37.
Such a norm may be derived from paragraph 69, which states that
77.
"felducation is a human right and an essential tool for achieving the goals of
equality, development and peace." Id. at 29.
Such a norm may be derived from paragraphs 112-13, which state In
78.
part that "[vliolence against women both violates and impairs or nullifies the
enjoyment by women of their human rights and fundamental freedoms." Id. at
51.
It would be too extensive to detail all of these potential norms that
79.
were not subject to reservation by states at the Conference. This Note will
consolidate all of these potential norms for the purposes of analysis. Since the
analysis set forth below evaluates the impdct of consensus on norms springing
from the Conference, this approach is acceptable, because all of these norms
Of course, the
received the same level of consensus (i.e., full consensus).
different proposals will necessarily travel at different paces toward status as
international law because state practice will almost certainly vary from proposal
to proposal.
Charney, supra note 69, at 544.
80.
See supra text accompanying notes 55-65.
81.

Such a norm may be derived from paragraphs 94-96 of the Platform,
82.
Paragraph 94 refers to the "right of men and women to be informed and to have
access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning...
as well as other methods of their choice . . . which are not against the law, and
health-care services that will enable women to go safely
the right of access to...
through pregnancy and childbirth[;]". See Conference Report, supra note 3, at 38.
Paragraph 95 refers to
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2.
The right of women to equality in succession and
inheritance laws; 8 3 and,
3.
The right to protection against unsafe abortions
and complications arising from
abortion (though not the
84
right to have a legal abortion).
The future of proposed norms that are subject to dissent at
an international forum is bleaker than for those that receive

strong support. Commentators have suggested that international
law in recent years has increasingly taken form pursuant to the
goals of normative development articulated at multilateral forums,

including diplomatic conferences,8 5 of which the Conference is an

example. In order to help predict the legal impact of the efforts
made at these forums, Professor Jonathan Charney has
articulated a multi-factored analysis8 6 whose indicators, when

reproductive rights... [that] rest on the recognition of the basic right of all
couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibility the number.
spacing and timing of their children and to have the information and
means to do so, and the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and
reproductive health. [Reproductive rights] also includ[e] [the right of
couples and individuals] to make decisions concerning reproduction free
of discrimination, coercion and violence[;]
Id. at 39.
Paragraph 96 states that the "human rights of women include their right to
have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their
sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health."
Id. Paragraph 232(f)
incorporates paragraphs 94-96 by reference, noting that governments should
"[take action to ensure that the human rights of women, including the rights
referred to in paragraphs 94 to 96... are fully respected and protected[.]" Id. at
100.
83.
Such a norm may be derived from paragraph 274(d), which states that
governments should take action to "[elliminate the injustice and obstacles in
relation to inheritance faced by the girl child so that all children may enjoy their
rights without discrimination, by, inter alla, enacting, as appropriate, and
enforcing legislation that guarantees equal right to succession and ensures equal
right to inherit, regardless of the sex of the chld[.]" Id. at 115.
84.
Such a norm may be derived from paragraph 106(), which calls on
governments to "Irlecognizeand deal with the health impact of unsafe abortion as
a major public health concern," and paragraph 106(k), which states that:
Women who have unwanted pregnancies should have ready access to

reliable information and compassionate counselling . .

.

[and,] in

circumstances where abortion is not against the law, such abortion should
be safe. In all cases, women should have access to quality services for the
management of complications arising from abortion.
Post-abortion
counselling, education and family-planning services should be offered
promptly[.I
Id. at 43.
85.
465.
86.

Charney, supra note 69, at 543-44; see also Stein, supra note 68, at
See Charney, supra note 69, at 544-45.
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applied to the results of a conference, may shed some light on this
question. Using Professor Charney's analytical framework, this
Note will evaluate: (1) the likely future, as a general matter, of
potential norms contained in the fully-supported sections of the
Platform; and (2) the likely future of potential norms contained in
subject to reservation or
the portions of the Platform that were
87
interpretation.
consensus-damaging
III. INDICATORS OF WHETHER THE POTENTIAL NORMS PROPOSED INTHE
CONFERENCE WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME INTERNATIONAL LAW

The first factor that may indicate a proposal's future is "how
clearly it is communicated to the [states participating in the
forum] that the rule under consideration reflects a refinement,
or progressive development of
codification, crystallization
88
international law."
A. Clarity with Which ParticipatingStates Understood the Potential
Legal Impact of the Adoption of the Platform Objectives
89
The Platform was admittedly non-binding on its members.
None of the participating states were under an international legal
obligation to implement any aspect of the Platform. 90 Wide
endorsement at a multinational forum, however, will go far toward
proving the type of international consensus needed for proposals
to harden into law.9 1 Given the importance of consensus in

87.

This Note will not include in its analysis the statements made about

three paragraphs:
(1) paragraph 5 (regarding commitment to allocation of resources), which
was subject to reservation by the United States for the reasons detailed
above, see supra text accompanying notes 37-46;
(2) any paragraph of the Health section that did not receive a reservation
aside from that of the Vatican (which reserved its position as to the
whole section, see Conference Report, supra note 3, at 163; and.
(3) paragraph 132, which received only one reservation, by the Central
African Republic.
In the latter two cases, the fact that the paragraphs received just one reservation
each indicates near-universal positive consensus on these paragraphs.

Charney, supra note 69, at 544.
88.
See, e.g., Conference Report. supra note 3, at 173 (statement of the
89.
United States noting that its interpretation of "commit[ment" as used in the
document is "consistent with the fact that the Platform, Declaration and
commitments made by States... are not legally binding, and that they consist
[onlyl of recommendations").
Id.
90.
Charney, supra note 69, at 546; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 70,
91.
at § 102 n.2 ( "International conferences... provide occasions for expressions by
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developing international law, it is unlikely that any state
participating in the Conference would be unaware of the potential
legal ramifications of adoption by the Conference of any proposals
for inclusion in the Platform.
As indicated above, some provisions of the Platform were
hotly debated among the member states9 2 before compromise and
acceptance into the Platform. This fact can be read as evidence
that member states viewed the adoption of the Platform seriously.
One reason that states would take the Platform seriously is the
knowledge that international consensus on a point indicates the
progressive development of international law in that area.
It is important to note, however, that some powerful
countries, such as China, did not state any reservations to the
Platform, though they had and continue to have state policies
that are in contravention of Platform tenets. 93 For example, while
not stating or recording any reservation to paragraph 94 of the
Platform, which supports the right of people to have "the freedom
to decide if, when, and how often to" reproduce, 9 4 China
announced that it would not revise its "one child" policy, and
continues its practice of forced sterilizations and abortions to
enforce that policy.9 5 Thus, although China publicly endorsed the
goals of the Platform, its level of commitment to putting them in
practice is subject to question.
Overall, however, open discussion of principles at an
international conference where 190 nations have delegates in
attendance is a strong publication of the fact that a norm may be
in the making. 96 States may choose to say one thing and do
another, but regardless of their ultimate practice, they most likely
were aware of the potential ramifications of the Conference.
B. Level of Support Given the Platform by Conference Participants;
Number of Objecting States

A second factor to be weighed is "the amount of support given
to the rule under consideration." 97
An element of this
consideration is the number of states that have made objections
states as to the law on particular questions. General consensus as to the law at

such a conference confirms customary law or contributes to its creation.").
92.
Bown,supra note 27.
93.
Tofani, supra note 8.
94.
Conference Report, supranote 3, at 38.
95.
Tofani, supra note 8.
96.
One commentator has noted that, "[a] rule adopted at a UN conference
or embodied in a General Assembly resolution is presented as a target for all

those who have objections to voice. Its adoption is a public, community act and
everyone involved knows of it." Stein, supra note 68, at 466.
97.
Charney, supra note 69, at 544.
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to the proposal under analysis. 98 As applied to the proposals of
the Conference, this predictor offers mixed results.
Most elements of the platform were non-controversial and
were widely supported. 99
The absence of controversy or
reservation regarding these sections is an indicator of
international consensus on the ideas underlying these provisions.
Additionally, it is fundamental that states must object to norms
they find objectionable during the development process if they
wish to halt the progression of international law towards that
norm.10 0 Thus, "the absence of objections ...

amounts to tacit

0
consent by participants" to an articulated developing norm.' '
Other matters, however, particularly those concerning
reproductive issues, sovereignty, and inheritance, were highly
10 2
contested among the delegates during the drafting process.
The following discussion will focus on those contested provisions.

1. Paragraphs Subject to Debate, Interpretation, or Reservation
As noted above, the final versions of these contested
provisions were subject to reservations and interpretive
statements by many countries that otherwise agreed to the overall
Platform. l0 3
Of course, for purposes of consensus, while a
reservation necessarily undermines a provision, not all
interpretive statements work to undermine the efficacy of the
language upon which they focus.' 0 4 However, the purpose of
interpretive statements is often to water down the impact of a
provision's wording.' 0 5 It is also possible that any interpretation,

98.

Id.

99.
See supra text accompanying notes 30 and 31.
100. RESTATEMENT, supra note 70 § 102 cmt. d.
101. Charney, supra note 69, at 544.
102. Tofani, supra note 8.
103. Most of these reservations came from countries with a strong Islamic
tradition. See supra text accompanying notes 47-54.
104. For example, Japan's interpretive statement about paragraph 106(k)
did not undermine that paragraph; nor did South Africa's interpretation of
paragraph 96. See infra text accompanying notes 145-48 (discussing Japan's
statement) and Infra note 105 (discussing South Africa's statement).
105. For example, both Iran and Iraq recorded statements indicating that
they interpreted paragraph 274(d) such that it does not conflict with the Islamic
Shariah. But the Shariah, which stipulates that fixed shares of the estate be
distributed to female and male relatives, is inconsistent with paragraph 274(d),
which calls for equal, gender-neutral rights of succession and equal rights to
inherit. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN INMUSLIM FAMILY LAW 5 (1982) (stating that
the Koran introduced "the primacy of distribution of certain fixed shares to
several categories of Quranically designated heirs comprised mainly of the nearest
female relatives ... [and, alfter these Quranic claims have been satisfied, the
residue of the estate is awarded to the nearest male ... relatives"); Conference
Report, supra note 3. at 115 (language of paragraph 274(d)).
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regardless of its impact on the meaning of the provision,
undermines consensus in being
a deviation from the norm of
10 6
interpretation by most states.
Statements of reservation to a provision are a clear strike
against positie consensus. The large number of states that made
oral reservations or interpretations to some portion of the
Platform-over one-third1 0 7 of the total number of participantswould seem to indicate a lack of overall consensus on the
Platform. When broken down, however, the number of countries
stating reservations
or consensus-damaging
interpretive
statements to each provision was small 1relative
to
the total
08
number of states that approved the Platform.
Additionally, excluding the blanket reservation that the
Vatican alone made to all twenty-two paragraphs of the Health
section, the number of provisions that were subject to reservation
by any state (ten in total)10 9 was very small in comparison with
the hundreds of paragraphs and sub-paragraphs that the
Platform contains. 110
Even including the Vatican's blanket
reservation, only twenty-six provisions in total were objected to by
any one state or another.1 1 1
The Platform contains 361
paragraphs, most of which are broken down into sub-

In contrast, however, South Africa's interpretation of paragraph 96,
interpreting "discrimination" to include discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, only serves to expand, and even strengthen, the scope of the
provision. Conference Report, supra note 3, at 157-77.
106. With the exception of interpretations such as Japan's, which merely
reiterated the same ideas contained in paragraph 106(k). See Infra discussion of
Japan's statement in text accompanying notes 145-48.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 45-54. Sixty-five states made
comments, many of them objections, to the Platform. See Conference Report,
supra note 3, at 157.
108. The total number of states making reservations or consensusdamaging interpretive statements to the contested paragraphs were as follows:
paragraph 5 received 1 such statement or reservation; paragraph 94 received 5;
paragraph 95 received 6; paragraph 96 received 19; paragraph 1060) received 4;
paragraph 106(k) received 14; paragraph 108(k) received 2; paragraph 132
received 1; paragraph 232(f) received 17; and paragraph 274(d) received 18,
including those countries that may be understood to have reserved as a result of
their blanket reservation to anything in contravention of the Shariah. See
generally Conference Report, supra note 3, at 157-77; Press Release 38, supra
note 47. For a detailed list of what countries made these statements, see Infra
notes 149-64. One hundred and ninety countries took part in the Conference.
Conference Report, supra note 3, at 138-40.
109. Paragraphs 5, 94, 95, 96 and 132, and sub-paragraphs 1060), 106(k),
108(k), 232(f), and 274(d) were all subject to reservations by one or more states.
See generally Conference Report, supra note 3, at 157-77.
110. See generally Conference Report, supra note 3.
111. That number includes all 22 paragraphs of the Health section plus
paragraphs 5, 132, and 232, and sub-paragraph 274(d).
See generally
Conference Report, supra note 3, at 157-77; Press Release 38, supra note 45.
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paragraphs, 1 12 and any one of these provisions could have been
subject to reservation.
The Islamic block of countries stated reservations against
portions of the Health section of the platform (paragraphs 94-96,
232(f) and 1060) and (k)), and also stated reservations or
interpretations generally to the detriment of the inheritance
language in the Platform (paragraph 274(d)).1 13 The Roman
Catholic block of countries that made statements largely did not
state reservations to specific paragraphs of the Platform,1 14 but
reiterated their stance against abortion, l l5 which is mentioned,
116
but not endorsed, in the Platform in paragraphs 1060) and (k).
However, the Vatican, as noted above, reserved its position as to
the entire Health section of the Platform, and the influence of
Roman Catholic doctrine is clearly felt in some of the domestic,

legal, and social norms of these countries." 17
2. Level of Support Overall

An analysis of this factor indicates that the level of support given
by Conference participants varies from provision to provision.
The support for the Platform overall, as indicated by the lack of
reservations to most of the provisions, is strong, but that support
drops off for certain provisions mainly because of the objections of
Islamic countries. Overall, the adoption of most of the Platform
without reservation is a positive sign for consensus on many
women's issues.
Although the number of objections stated to a proposal is an
important predictive factor, the question of whether a rule
eventually becomes law turns on other key information. Factors
relevant to this analysis include the "nature of [the states']
objections [and] the importance of the interests they seek to
' 18
protect [with their objections.]""
112. See generally Conference Report, supra note 3.
113. See generally Id. at 156-61.
114. The Holy See, Paraguay and Peru did, however, reserve their positions
as to specific paragraphs. See supra note 51.
115. See supra note 53.
116. See supra notes 58-59 (reprinting paragraphs 106J) and 106(k)). For
further discussion on the question of abortion rights and paragraphs 106(J) and
106(k), see supra note 54.
117. At least one Latin American state, for example, includes the right to life
of a fetus in its national constitution. See Conference Report, supra note 3, at
158 (statement of Argentina that no reference in the Platform should be
interpreted as "abrogating the condemnation of abortion ... in accordance with
article 75 . . . of the Constitution of Argentina"). Roman Catholic doctrine
opposes the practice of abortion, and Argentina's population Is 91% Roman
Catholic. 1996 CAThOLIC ALMANAC, supra note 48, at 334.
118. Charney, supra note 69, at 544-45.
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C. Nature of the States' Objections and Importance of the Interests
They Were Protecting

1. Objections Based on Religious Beliefs
As noted above, many provisions of the Platform were not
objectionable to any of the nations, 1 19 but other provisions were

challenged by many states. For this latter group of provisions,
the objections they received could pose a substantial obstacle to

legal norms
the progression of the proposals toward international
120
because the objections were religious in nature.
Many of the states issuing reservations and consensusdamaging interpretations explicitly cited religious beliefs as the
cause of their dissent. 12 1 It is intuitive that religious interests are
important to the followers of any faith; this fact holds true even
more so in countries where the state itself has a religious
affiliation. Most of the dissenting countries with a high Islamic
population either identify themselves as Islamic states or state
that Islam is their state religion. 12 2 For the Vatican, Catholicism
is the whole purpose of its existence, so religious concerns are of
paramount importance.
Such religious considerations could not be easily overcome
short of doctrinal reinterpretation by the Vatican of its position on
issues such as birth control and abortion, or reinterpretation of
the Islamic Shariah. In both cases, such interpretation is
possible, but probably not likely in the near future. Of course,
changes have been made in both Catholic and Islamic religious
doctrines in the past. Between 1962 and 1965, the Catholic
Church held the Vatican II Council, which recognized substantial
changes in church doctrine. 1 23 However, the Catholic Church
119. See supra text accompanying note 31.
120. Tofani, supra note 8.
121. See Conference Report, supra note 3, at 157-177 (reservations and
interpretations of the Vatican, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia).
122. At least 13 of the 25 Islamic countries noting reservations identify
themselves as an Islamic state or Islam as their state religion: Algeria,
Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan, and Yemen. The remainder
have a very high percentage of citizens who practice Islam: Bahrain (100%);

Indonesia (90%); Iraq (90%); Maldives (100%); Oman (100%); Qatar (100%); and
the United Arab Emirates (100%). Comoros, Mali, Niger, Syrian Arab Republic,
and Tunisia all are predominantly Islamic countries also. See Conference Report,
supra note 3, at 157 (listing all of the countries that made oral statements and
reservations); 1996 CATHOLIC ALMANAC, supra note 48, at 333-67 (listing the

religious affiliations of the countries of the world).
123. 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 201 (1987). Changes were made to core
religious issues such as, for example, the possibility of salvation. Id. at 204-05.
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has been stalwart in its positions on both birth control 12 4 and
abortion,1 2 5 even in the face of substantial opposition by members
of its faith. 126 So it does not seem likely that the Vatican wil
adjust its position on these issues soon, absent a major shift in
position by the powerful members of the Church hierarchy.
The potential for change in Islamic doctrines is slightly more
complex. Islam is not hierarchical and centralized in the way
Catholicism is, and interpretations of the Shariah vary among
different schools of Islamic law. Thus there is no totally uniform

Shariah law that governs all Islamic countries. It is clear that
many Islamic countries have changed their traditional Shariah
law to conform to international norms in some areas. Shariah
law, however, is divided into two spheres-public and privateand public law reform has come much more easily to Muslim
nations than private law reform. 12 7 The public law sphere
includes areas such as constitutional order, criminal law,
international law, and public-sphere human rights, while the
128
private law sphere covers religious practice and personal life.
The only areas that have been effectively reformed thus far have
been in public law. 129 Shariah law governing religious practice
and personal life (into which category these disputed reforms
3 0 has traditionally been much more difficult to
would fall)'
131
reform.
Because of the religious component underlying the bulk of
the reservations to the Platform, the interest the states wish to
protect with their reservations is an important one. In the main
block of countries that opposed specific provisions of the
Platform-the Islamic countries-such large portions of the

124. The Catholic Church's position on birth control is contrary to the
ideals espoused in Platform paragraphs 94-96 and 232(f).
The Catholic Church's position on abortion may be contrary to the
125.
ideals espoused in Platform paragraphs 1060) and 106(k).
126.
American Catholics, in particular, oppose the Vatican positions on
birth control and abortion.
Stevenson Swanson & Vincent J. Schodolski,
Changing Faces, Faith of Catholic Church, TIMES UNION, January 19, 1997, at Al.

A recent poll showed that 82% of Catholic Americans believe that women should
be able to obtain legal abortions. Veto Unlikely to Affect Most Catholics' Votes,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 23, 1996, at A8.

127. Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and the United Nations
Convention on the Eliminationof All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women: Are the
Sharl'aand the Convention Compatible? 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1949, 1970-76 (1995).
128. Id. at 1971.
129. Id. at 1971-72.
130. Reproductive issues, addressed in contested paragraphs 94-95, 233(0),
106() and 106(k)), for example, are clearly personal in nature. Succession rights,
addressed in paragraph 274(d), are family-oriented and thus personal in nature
as well.
131. Venkatraman, supra note 127, at 1972.
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population are members of Islam that the religion is deeply
embedded in the culture. Cultural and religious standards are
clearly important interests to states. As a result, states will
vigorously seek to protect their autonomy in such areas. Because
of their importance and intransigence, objections based in

religious beliefs pose a substantial hurdle to the ultimate
development of a proposed rule into international law.
2. Objections Based On Cultural Norms
Almost all of the countries with objections to parts of the
or developing countries. 132
Platform were non-Western
Commentators have voiced concerns in the past about attempts
by Western countries to impose a foreign set of values on the
generally more-conservative Third World countries. 13 3 Malaysia
explicitly addressed this concern in its statement, noting that the
negotiations of the Platform revealed
a number of differences among delegations arising from the stand
on certain issues by one group of countries [impliedly the West].
While this group may adopt their own cultural standards and
priorities, their insistence on others [adopting their standards] has
inevitably resulted in the Platform .

number of reservations.

13 4

.

. being accompanied by a

Partially reinforcing this insistence on cultural autonomy were the
statements made by several nations reiterating state
sovereignty. 135 Several more states explicitly made statements
alluding to or asserting their own cultural autonomy in their
comments. 136 Inclusion of such comments in the statements of
so many countries indicates that there was a groundswell of
concern among these states about having foreign values thrust
upon them.
These concerns reflect a cultural relativist' 37 argument
against the forced adoption of certain norms. The theory of

132. The bulk of the objections came from Middle Eastern and Latin
American countries. See supra note 47 (listing all of the states that made

consensus-damaging statements.)
133. Pope John Paul H has said that the attempt by First World nations to
impose Western, non-traditional values on the Third World is a "form of neocolonialism." Gregory M. Saylin, The United Nations International Conference on
Population and Development. Religion, Tradition, and Law In Latin America, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 1245. 1263 (1995).
134. Conference Report, supra note 3, at 168-69.
135. See supranote 66, detailing such statements.
136. Those countries were: Egypt, Guatemala, Iran, Malaysia, Mauritania,
and Morocco. See generally Press Release 38, supra note 45.
137. The theory of cultural relativism states that "substantive human rights
standards vary among different cultures and necessarily reflect national
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cultural relativism, of course, is not without opposition among
academics and the international community. 138 Even at the
Conference, there was some support for the idea that cultural
traditions are not sufficient reason to support ongoing
discrimination and human rights violations. Norwegian Prime
Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland noted in her statement to the
Conference that "[tihere are limits to the practices that countries

can expect the international community to accept, or condone,
even when such practices have deep
cultural roots. This is where
13 9
human rights enter the picture."
Cultural relativism is an argument that cuts to the core of
international human rights law and has the power to negate
human rights standards that contradict traditional state
practices.
It is particularly destructive to norms regarding
discrimination or human rights violations specific to women,
because such violations may arise in contexts that are
traditionally social or personal. For example, domestic relations
have traditionally been thought of as personal in nature, or within
the personal or social realm. The problem of spousal violence, a
prominent women's issue, likely comes under the rubric of
domestic relations, and so arises in a traditionally social-personal
context. In contrast, a human rights issue such as the torture of
political prisoners, for example, is clearly not personal in nature;
rather, it is political. Thus a claim of cultural tradition in this
area would be weaker than in an area that implicates social
standards and norms.
In fact, because of the traditional
identification of women with domesticity and family life, any
international norm regarding women's issues or status could
carry the imprimatur of the personal or social, and thus could be
more vulnerable to attack on the basis of a cultural relativism

argument.
3. Strength of the Objections
The vehemence with which both the Islamic and Catholic
contingents fought various provisions of the Platform is one final
indicator that the interests protected by the dissents were

idiosyncrasies," and that "[tolerance and respect for self-determination preclude
cross cultural normative judgments... [or, in the alternative, that] even If,
as a
matter of customary or conventional international law, a body of substantive
human rights norms exists, its meaning varies substantially from culture to
culture." Fernando R.Tes6n, InternationalHuman Rights and CulturalRelativism,
25 VA. J. INT'L L. 869, 871 (1985).
138. See td. at 873-75 (stating that human rights standards are universal,
not impacted by cultural differences, and are uniform across national borders).
139. Tofani, supra note 8.
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important to the states involved. 140 The Vatican delegation to the
Conference, citing its "well-known position[s]' 14 1 on reproductive
and sexual matters, was untiring in its advocacy on many issues
throughout the drafting period at the Conference.' 42 At this same
time, the Islamic countries were also actively lobbying against
certain provisions.' 4 3 If these countries had not considered their
interests important, they would not have been so active in their
advocacy of their viewpoints. All of the factors above point to the
fact that the interests that the states were protecting with their
objections to the final Platform language were of great importance
to them.
D. Whether the Substance of Objections to the Platform Goes to the
Heart of the ProposedRule or to Subsidiary Issues
Another indicator is whether the substance of the objections
made by the states goes to the heart of the proposal or only stems
4
This factor
from objections regarding subsidiary issues.' 4
indicates support or a lack thereof for the underlying principles of
the potential norm.
Japan's interpretive statement regarding paragraph 106(k) is
one example of a statement involving a subsidiary issue.
Paragraph 106(k) stated in pertinent part that countries should
"consider reviewing laws containing punitive measures against
women who have undergone illegal abortions" [and that] [a]ny
measures or changes related to abortion within the health system
can only be determined at the national or local level according to
Japan's interpretive
the national legislative process." 145
statement noted that "relevant national laws [on the abortion
issue] can only be reviewed at the national or local level with due
6
regard to national and legislative circumstances[,]"1 4 thereby
expressing its sensitivity to the issue of cultural autonomy
regarding the interpretation of that paragraph. In the context of
paragraph 106(k), since the paragraph explicitly states that "[any
measures or changes related to abortion within the health system
can only be determined at the national or local level according to
the national legislative process, " 14 7 (a direct acknowledgment of

Some proposed provisions were ultimately removed from the Platform
140.
as a result of these contingents' opposition. Bown, supra note 27.
Conference Report, supranote 3, at 163.
141.

142.
143.

Bown, supra note 27.
Tofani, supra note 8.

144.
145.
146.
147.

Charney. supra note 69, at 545.
Conference Report, supra note 3, at 43.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 43.
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national sovereignty in this area), the statement of Japan was
generally consistent with, and was simply a reiteration of, the
message of the paragraph. Many of the interpretive statements
did
went to subsidiary issues or nuances of understanding that
14 8
overall.
paragraph
the
of
impact
the
affect
not substantially
However, all of the reservations where the reason behind the
reservation was articulated, clearly could be seen to go to the
substance of the paragraph they were addressing. It Is useful in
this analysis to look in detail at the language used by states when
For example,
stating their reservation or interpretation.
reservations were stated against paragraph 96149 by nineteen
countries: Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Iran, the
Vatican, Malaysia, Tunisia,15 0 Yemen, Sudan, the United Arab
Republic, Lebanon, Benin, Djibouti, Syria, Pakistan, Jordan, and
Maldives. l 5 l Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Yemen,
Sudan, United Arab Republic, Lebanon, Benin, Djibouti, Syria,
Jordan, and Maldives all stated that paragraph 96 was
incompatible with their social, cultural or religious values, or with
the Islamic Shariah, or with their national law generally. All of
the states presented this incompatibility as the reason for their
reservations.' 5 2 Such a wholesale rejection of the provision on
the basis of this incompatibility clearly indicates that the
objections went to the heart of the issue.
Iran reserved its position regarding the paragraph as applied
outside the confines of marriage. 153 It is debatable whether Iran's
reservation undercut a central tenet of the norm. On the one
hand, Iran accepts the proposal for that portion of women who
are married, and so seemingly does not have an objection to the
basic concept of reproductive autonomy. The counter-argument,
however, would focus on the fact that paragraph 96 calls the
"right to have control over ... matters related to... sexuality" a
"human righ[t] of women."'1 4 Denial of this right to one segment
(the unmarried segment) of the population is inconsistent with
the idea that the right is a human right, which should be
So Iran's statement can also be seen as
available to all.
fundamentally running counter to the proposed rule.

148.

See generally Id.at 157-77; see also supra text accompanying note 46

(listing the countries whose statements did not damage positive consensus on any
portions of the Platform.)
149. Again, paragraph 96 concerns sexual and reproductive health and

autonomy. See supra note 57 for the full text of paragraph 96.
150. See Conference Report, supranote 3, at 157-77.
151. See Press Release 38, supra note 45, at 7-11.
152. Id.
153. Conference Report, supra note 3. at 166.

154.

Id. at 39.
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The Vatican reserved its position to the entire section that
contained paragraph 96, citing the section's "totally unbalanced
attention to sexual and reproductive health in comparison to
women's other health needs[.]" I5 5 The import of this language is
unclear. While the Vatican's opposition to most forms of fertility
control is well known, the language used here, combined with its
broad reservation, is not specific enough to aid in this analysis.
Pakistan did not state a reason for its reservation. 5 6 Two other
countries made interpretive statements regarding paragraph 96.
Of those two, Malaysia's did not undercut the central tenet of the
proposal,' 5 7 while the impact of Tunisia's statement is not clear
because of the generality of its language. 158 However, wherever
an actual reservation was stated, if a reason was given for the
reservation, it did cut at the central ideas of the proposal. Thus,
putting aside the two interpretive statements, fifteen of the
seventeen reservations stated by countries against paragraph 96
went to the heart of the proposed rule; and in the case of those

other two reservations, the reasons underlying them were simply
unclear.
A similar analysis of the other provisions with multiple
objections reveals that two of five of the reservations to paragraph
94,159 four of six objections to paragraph 95,160 three of four of

155. Id. at 163-64.
156.
Press Release 38, supra note 45, at 10.
157.
Malaysia stated that its acceptance of paragraph 96 "does not signify
[its] endorsement . . . of sexual promiscuity, any form of sexual perversion or
sexual behaviour that is synonymous with homosexuality or lesbianism."
Conference Report, supra note 3, at 169. In light of the fact that the Platform
overall did not endorse homosexuality, this likely does not take away anything
from the intended meaning of paragraph 96.
Tunisia stated that it would interpret the paragraph within its
158.
"fundamental laws and texts," language which lends itself to speculation, but
ultimately is not sufficiently detailed to allow for analysis. Id. at 172.
159.
Kuwait's reservation indicated that the paragraph was "in
contravention of the Islamic Shariah[.]" Conference Report, supra note 3, at 167.
Similarly, Qatar stated that the paragraph ran "counter to Islamic law." Press
Release 38, supra note 45, at 9. As with paragraph 96, such a blanket statement
of incompatibility between the proposal and the Shariah as the basis of the
reservation seems a clear rejection of the proposal's core tenets.
Paraguay interpreted "methods" of family planning as including only those in
conformity with its national legislation. Conference Report, supra note 3, at 171.
Obviously some methods of birth control are not legal in Paraguay, and this
limitation effectively nullifies the provision for any woman who does not have
However, since Paraguay is
access to those methods that are acceptable.
supportive of the proposal in at least some settings, its interpretation cannot be
said to cut against the heart of the proposal.
Djibouti did not state the reason for its reservation. See Press Release 38,

supra note 45, at 9. Finally, the Vatican's blanket statement regarding the whole
Health section is not detailed enough to bear analysis. See text accompanying
supra note 156.
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the objections to paragraph 106(j),16 1 at least nine of the fourteen
objections to paragraphs 106(k), 16 2 and at least eleven of the
seventeen objections to paragraph 232(f) went to the important
substance of the proposals. 16 3 Additionally, at least fourteen of

160. Kuwait's reservation indicated that the paragraph was "in
contravention of the Islamic Shariah[,]" and Iran and Iraq accepted the paragraph
only within the framework of marriage, which as stated in the text accompanying
note 152, effectively undermines the substance of the proposal. Conference
Report, supra note 3, at 157-77. Qatar stated that the paragraph ran "counter to
Islamic law[,]" and Djibouti did not state the reason for its reservation. Press
Release 38, supra note 46, at 9. The Vatican's blanket statement regarding the
See text
whole Health section is not detailed enough to bear analysis.
accompanying supra note 156.
Libya rejected "everything included in and intended by" both 106(k)
161.
and 106(j). Conference Report, supra note 3, at 168. Mauritania rejected "any
matter that conflicts with the Islamic Shariah and Islamic values, especially...
paragraph 106U)." Id. at 170. The United Arab Emirates reserved its position as
to paragraph 1060) as well as "all others that are contrary to Islamic law." Press
Release, supra note 45, at 8. All three of these objections go to the heart of the
proposed norm, declaring as they do either explicit outright rejection of the
proposal or that the proposal Is contrary to Islamic law. The Vatican's blanket
statement regarding the whole Health section is not detailed enough to bear
analysis. See text accompanying supra note 156.
162. The interpretive statements of Japan and Malaysia were innocuous.
Japan noted, with regard to paragraph 106(k), that the relevant laws regarding
abortion are "a matter of domestic policy and circumstances[,]" and Malaysia
stated that, while agreeing with the paragraph's proposal to prevent unsafe
abortions and provide health care for post-abortion complications, It reiterated its
anti-abortion stance, none of which contradicts the message of the paragraph.
Conference Report, supra note 3, at 167, 169. Kuwait, however, stated that It
reserved against "anything which constitutes a contravention of the Islamic
Shariah... particularly paragraphl... 106(k)!.]" which constituted an outright
rejection of the paragraph. Id. at 167. Libya rejected "everything included in and
intended by" both 106(k) and 1060). Id. at 168. Morocco stated that It reserved
its position on paragraph 106(k) because it was "in contradiction with the
precepts of Islam and not in conformity with its spiritual values and cultural
traditions." Id. at 170. Lebanon, Benin, Qatar, Jordan, and Maldives all rejected
the provision outright because it did not conform with national or Islamic law, or
their religious and cultural beliefs. Press Release 38, supra note 47, at 8, 9, 11.
These five objections struck at the core of the proposal. Yemen, Sudan, and
Djibouti did not state the reasons for their reservations. Id. at 7, 9. The Vatican's
blanket statement regarding the whole Health section is not detailed enough to
bear analysis. See text accompanying supra note 156. Thus, of the fourteen
consensus-damaging statements or reservations regarding paragraph 106(J), nine
went to the heart of the proposal; and of the other six reservations and
statements, four of the countries did not give reasons for their reservations and so
cannot be evaluated.
163. Yemen, Sudan, Djibouti, and Pakistan did not state reasons for their
reservations. Press Release, supra note 45, at 7, 9, 10. United Arab Emirates,
Lebanon, Benin, Syria, and Jordan, see Id. at 8, 10, 11, and Iraq, Kuwait, Libya,
Mauritania, and Morocco, see Conference Report, supra note 3, at 167, 168. 170,
all reserved their positions because the paragraph was deemed contrary to

Islamic or national law or the state's religious and cultural values. Id. at 8, 10,
11. Those reservations clearly go to the substance of the proposal. The Vatican's
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the eighteen objections to paragraph 274(d)16 4 struck at the
central meanings of the rules proposed in those paragraphs.
Thus, for paragraphs 94-96, 232(f), 274(d), and 1060) and (k)
(implicating the proposed "reproductive rights" norm, equality in
norm
concerns
succession norm, and abortion/health
respectively), either all or a majority of state objections went to
the heart of the rules proposed, a factor that argues against their
rapid inclusion into international law.
F. Relative Geopolitical Standing of the States Opposing and
Supporting the Disputed PlatformProvisions

Another important factor in this analysis is the relative
geopolitical standing of the states opposing and supporting the
disputed Platform provisions. As stated above, most provisions

blanket statement regarding the whole Health section is not detailed enough to
bear analysis. See text accompanying supra note 156. Iran made the same
statement regarding paragraph 232(f)as it did regarding paragraph 96, see supra
note 153, and according to the same analysis as in the text accompanying notes
153-54, its statement is seen to be a rejection of the fundamental substance of
the proposal. Tunisia interpreted paragraph 232(f) within its "fundamental laws
and texts." Conference Report, supra note 3, at 172. In this context, the import
of this general statement is too unclear to provide information for analysis.
164. Paragraph 274(d) deals with the inheritance rights of women. Id. at
115. Morocco reserved its position without comment. Id. at 170. Iraq, Libya and
Sudan accepted the provision under their interpretation that it does not conflict
with the Islamic Shariah. See Conference Report, supra note 3 at 167-68 and
Press Release, supra note 47 at 7. The Shariah does, however, conflict with the
provision at a basic level. See supra text accompanying note 65. So these
Interpretations do go to the heart of the proposal. Egypt said that it would
interpret the provision in accordance with the Shariah, which likely does go to the
substance of the proposal since the Shariah is at odds with the principles of strict
equality underlying the provision. Conference Report, supra note 3, at 160.
Tunisia, an Islamic country, interpreted the provision "within [its] fundamental
laws and texts[.J" Conference Report, supra note 3, at 172. Similarly, Iran, also
an Islamic country, interpreted the references to inheritance in the Platform "in
accordance with the principles of the economic system of Iran." Id. at 166. The
statements of Tunisia and Iran likely do run counter to the principles of the
provision, but absent a study of those countries' inheritance laws, which this
Author has not undertaken, such statements cannot be used in this analysis.
Mauritania rejected the provision because it "conflicts with the Islamic Shariah
and Islamic values." Id. at 170. The United Arab Emirates and Syria also
rejected the paragraph because it conflicted with Islam. See Press Release 38,
supra note 45, at 8, 10. Djibouti did not state the reason for its reservation. See
Id. at 9. Oman, Brunei Darussalem, Yemen, Bahrain, Comoros and Qatar all
make blanket objections to any provision contrary to Islamic law, see generally
Press Release 38, supra note 45, as did Kuwait, see Conference Report, supra
note 3. at 167. Paragraph 274(d) is almost certainly contrary to Islamic law. See
supra note 65 and accompanying text. Such a blanket rejection must strike at
the heart of the proposal. Thus at least 14 of the countries' objections went to the
substance of the proposed rule.
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enjoyed the full support of all of the states at the Conference. For
those provisions that were subject to dispute, however, the most
The United
powerful states were generally still supporters.
States, as noted above, was a powerful supporter of the Platform
in spite of5 its one reservation and many interpretive
16
statements.
Additionally, most politically powerful states, including most
Western countries, and powerful Eastern countries like Russia,
168
6 7 supported the Platform in full.
Japan, 6 6 India, and China,'

Full support was extended by all permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council 6 9 (with the exception of the
United States, whose comments and reservation were not
Additionally, all
consensus-damaging, as noted above).1 70
nations,
members of the Group of Seven' 7 ' leading 17industrial
2
except the United States, had no reservations.
With regard to the disputed provisions of the Platform, the
countries that objected to those provisions were generally
developing countries, who tend to have less political influence due

See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
165.
Japan did record an interpretive statement to paragraph 106(k), but
166.
the overall effect of the statement was not to undermine the Impact of the
paragraph. See Conference Report, supra note 3. at 167. Japan noted that
.relevant national laws [on the abortion issue] can only be reviewed at the
national or local level with due regard to national and legislative circumstances[,I"
td., in response to paragraph 106(k)'s suggestion that countries "consider
reviewing laws containing punitive measures against women who have undergone
illegal abortions[.]" Id. at 43. Paragraph 106(k) also states that "[alny measures
or changes related to abortion within the health system can only be determined at
the national or local level according to the national legislative process." Id. Thus
Japan's statement did not go beyond emphasizing and reiterating what the
paragraph said Itself.
167. Although, as stated above, China may not have actually been as
supportive of the Platform as Its public statements indicated. See supra text
accompanying notes 93-95.
Tofani, supra note 8; Conference Report, supra note 3, at 157-77.
168.
See generally Conference Report, supra note 3, at 157-77; see also
169.
Infra note 170 (detailing the comments of France). The permanent members of

the United Nations Security Council are China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and
the United States. U.N. CHARTER art. 23.
See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
170.
171.
The Group of Seven, or G-7, comprises the seven countries with the
largest economies. Jonathan E. Sanford, Foreign Debts to the U. S. GovernmentRecent Rescheduling and Forgiveness, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 345, 348
(1995).
The Group of Seven includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
172.
the United Kingdom, and the United States. AG-7 to Start 3-Day Summit In Lyons
with Working Dinner, Japan Economic Newswire, June 27. 1996, available In
LEXIS, News Library, JEN File.
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to their lesser economic power. 173
The exceptions to this
observation are the Middle Eastern countries, most of which
stated or recorded reservations or interpretive statements 174 and
which are powerful because of their important role in the world
fuel economy. By and large, however, the balance of power of
countries was in favor of full support of the Platform.
G. Whether Supportfor the Platform Cuts Across Interest Groups
A fmal and important consideration is whether support for
the rule cuts across all interest groups, with dissenters being
relatively isolated states, or whether the pattern of dissents

indicates that an important group of states does not support the

rule. 175 In analyzing the disputed portions of the Platform, it is
clear that the dissents to the proposed norms cluster around one
main group of states.
Objections to paragraphs 94-96 and related paragraph 232(f),
implicating the proposed "reproductive rights" norms, were made
by the Vatican and a block of Islamic countries. 17 6 Additionally,
Paraguay and Peru made damaging statements regarding
paragraph 94; however, no objections to these paragraphs were
made by any of the other predominantly Catholic states recording
their statements. Assuming, then, that only the Islamic countries
objected as a block to these provisions, it remains the case that a
clearly definable and united block of countries objects to the
potential norm.

173.
Nearly all countries that stated reservations or made interpretive
statements were small or developing countries. See Conference Report, supra
note 3, at 157 (listing all countries that stated oral reservations or interpretive
statements to the Platform). Exceptions to this rule were Canada, France, Japan,
and the United States. However, none of the comments of any of these countries
undercut consensus for any of the Platform provisions. Regarding the comments
and reservation of the United States, see supra text accompanying notes 37-39,
and regarding the comments of Japan, see supra note 166. France's statement
was that paragraph 247-regarding, in pertinent part, the use and testing of
nuclear weapons-did not accurately reflect the work of the drafting committee.
Press Release 38, supra note 45, at 3 and 7. For the text of paragraph 247, see
Conference Report, supra note 3, at 106.
Canada's statement was against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Muldrew, supra note 46, at 13.
Thus the statements of France and Canada did not diminish consensus for any of
the norms under discussion here.
174.
See Conference Report, supra note 3, at 157 (listing all countries that
stated oral reservations or interpretive statements to the Platform, including:
Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and Yemen).
175.
Chamey, supra note 69, at 545.
176.
See supra text accompanying notes 149-58 and supra text of notes
159-63, for details of the objections to paragraphs 94-96, 1060) and (k), and
232(f).
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Regarding paragraph 274(d), a block of countries-Muslim
countries--objected to the proposed rule. 177 Thus, again, a
definable block of related countries objected to the potential norm
implicated by paragraph 274(d) (the equal succession rights
norm). Almost all Islamic countries objected to this norm, either
explicitly stating a reservation or a contradictory interpretation to
or reservation against
the paragraph, or by making a statement
78
anything that contradicts Islamic law. 1
Regarding paragraphs 106(j) and (k), again, except for the
Vatican, exclusively Islamic countries stated reservations to these
provisions. 179 The objections to these two paragraphs implicate a
unified, well-defined group of states (i.e., the Muslim states).
Thus support does not cut across all interest groups for any of
these disputed norms; one global interest group of states-the
Islamic states-is opposed to all of these proposed norms.
IV.

THE LEGAL IMPACT OF THE CONFERENCE

Based on the framework stated by Professor Charney, the
non-disputed provisions of the Platform are in a position to shape
States participating in the
and become international law.
discussions of the Conference were clearly aware of the potential
impact of the discourse on international law, and the
international support given these provisions was complete.
Support for these norms cut across all state interest groups.
Given state practice, the non-disputed provisions of the Platform
should reach the status of international law with little delay. Of
course, this state practice is not at all assured.
In contrast, the analysis of Professor Charney's factors
produces mixed signals for norms springing out of the disputed
provisions of the Platform. The overall outlook for those norms to
develop in the near future is poor.
Regarding the disputed provisions of the Health section
(paragraphs 94-96, related paragraph 232(f), 180 and paragraphs
106(j) and 106(k)), the level of full support enjoyed by most other
provisions of the Platform decreased notably. A united block of

See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
177.
See id.
178.
179. Many Catholic countries chose to reiterate their stance against
abortion generally in their statements. Of course, the right to obtain a legal
abortion was never proposed in the Platform, but obviously the language of the

Platform regarding these issues was still too liberal for some states.
180. Paragraph 232() lists "actions to be taken" by governments and
incorporates by reference paragraphs 94-96. Conference Report, supra note 3, at
100.
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countries-the Muslim states-objected to the paragraphs.
Additionally, the Vatican objected to the whole of the Health
section as well as related paragraph 232(f). In the case of both
the Muslim states and the Vatican, the cultural and religious
interests that the states sought to protect with their objections
are important interests that the states will likely seek to protect
vigorously. The states' objections tended to go to the substance of
the provisions and not to less important or negotiable subsidiary
issues. Additionally, support for the disputed provisions does not
run though all interest groups because at least one interest group
is uniformly opposed to the provisions.

Regarding paragraph 274(d), implicating a potential norm for
equal succession rights, the analysis is much the same as above,
except that only the Muslim countries were opposed to the
provision.
Once again, however, the states' objections were
religious in nature; paragraph 274(d), if it progressed to the
status of an international norm, would endanger succession rules
that are embedded in Islamic tradition and are also specifically
dictated by Shariah law. Thus, it is clear that the Islamic states
seek to protect important cultural and religious interests with
their objections, and their objections go to the heart of the
proposed rule. State support for this provision of the Platform is
not broad-based because it does not include the support of the
Islamic states, which constitute a unified interest group.
On the other hand, for all of the disputed provisions
discussed above, the countries that were supporters of those
provisions were generally more geopolitically powerful than the
countries that opposed the provisions. Also, as stated above, the
number of states that objected to each disputed provision was
very small in relation to the total number of states that
participated in the Conference. In fact, paragraphs 232(f) and
274(d) had the most consensus-damaging statements or
reservations with eighteen; paragraph 96 had seventeen;
paragraph 106(k) had fourteen; paragraph 95 had six; paragraph
94 had five; paragraph 1060) had four; and paragraph 108(k) had
two.' 8 1 Obviously, the greater the number of reservations to each
particular paragraph, the greater damage there is to positive
international consensus on the potential norm it contained.

Reservations to paragraph 232(fW, which includes by reference
paragraphs 94-96, implicates consensus for all of those
paragraphs.
Additionally, in each case, a unified block of
countries, not just unaffiliated states, opposed the provision and
thus the potential norm it implicated. This in itself is a strong
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factor against the consensus necessary for the provisions to grow
into international law.
Professor Charney has expressed skepticism regarding the
legal import of majority votes at international forums such as the
Conference.' 8 2
Charney notes that "decisionmaking in
multilateral forums can be abused and the results may fail to
reflect political, economic or military realities . . . Thus, voting
majorities that exclude certain groups of states, or fal to reflect

geopolitical power
or the views of the most interested states, are
i8 3

highly suspect."
One political reality that cannot be overlooked Is the domestic
resistance that will likely be faced by the changes proposed in the
Platform. As noted above, cultural relativism undercuts those
norms that are personal in nature most severely.
This is
particularly crucial because of the way that international law
usually works, especially in the area of human rights.
Compliance with norms is often achieved by placing international
pressure on rogue states. It is difficult to imagine the full weight
of international political pressure being brought to bear upon184a
state over an issue such as access to family planning methods.
Nevertheless, access to appropriate family planning methods
likely impacts the individual woman in terms of day-to-day living
as much as, to use an example of a "public" arena human right
concern, living under a repressive regime.
Another political reality is the cost of implementing many of
the Platform's objectives. All of the Western states, including the
United States, were under the pinch of domestic budget
constraints and would not commit substantial additional
resources for helping other countries implement the Platform,
especially the Third World. 185 The United States would not even
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The RESTATEMENT also makes such a suggestion, noting that:

[Mlajorities [of international organizations] may be tempted to declare as

existing law what they would like the law to be, and less weight must be
given to such a resolution when it declares law in the interest of the
majority and against the interest of a strongly dissenting minority.
RESTATEMENT. supra note

70,at § 103 n.2.

The disputed provisions of the Platform do have a "strongly dissenting

minority": the Muslim states. This fact only underlines the uncertainty of those
provisions' futures.
183. Charney, supra note 69, at 545 n.62.
184. Although, in light of the increasing rate of human population growth,
burgeoning environmental problems may ultimately make this a pressing
international concern.
185. Bown, supra note 27.
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commit to full implementation of the objectives within its own
8 6

borders. 1
Additionally, some states ostensibly supported provisions of
the Platform, raising no objection to them, while maintaining
domestic practices that contravene those very provisions. The
example of China, with its one-child policy, has already been
noted above.' 8 7 Another example of this phenomenon is that the
Islamic states, so far as the recorded objections show, did not
raise any objection to paragraph 274(e), which states that
countries should "[e]nact and strictly enforce laws to ensure that
marriage is only entered into with the free and full consent of the
intending spouses .... 188 However, at least one Muslim country,
Morocco, allows for marriages to be arranged against a woman's
will, even if she is an adult, unless she has been previously
married. 189
Examples such as these raise the question of
whether these states were sufficiently focused on the drafting of
the Platform or viewed its impact seriously. If they did not, they
certainly will not implement its objectives now.
One intended indicator of whether states would implement
the Platform was the Commitments Scoreboard developed by the
non-governmental organizations at their meeting and posted for
viewing at the Conference. All states were to make public their
specific commitments to implementing the Platform's objectives.
Only one-third of the states actually made such a statement. 190
Thus there may be valid concern as to the development of the
state practice required to solidify the proposals of the Conference
as international legal norms. If states do not take their

endorsement of the Platform objectives seriously, or if domestic
financial
constraints
dampen commitment
or
hamper
enforcement of these human rights, then state practice may not
follow. This eventuality would not bode well for the progression of
the Platform's provisions towards international legal norms.
It has been noted that "the reform of personal status codes
appears to many men not as an advantage but as a loss of rights
and powers[;] deep psychological biases and fears mesh with
religion and tradition and with the total organization of society to
form a barrier [to change]." 19 1 In the human rights arena,
agreement to and implementation of women's rights face unique

186. See supra text accompanying note 39.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
188. Conference Report, supra note 3, at 115.
189. Venkatraman, supra note 127, at 1978.
190. Promtsesfor Women: Will they be kept after Beging?, AP, Sept. 14, 1995,
available In 1995 WL 4406159.
191.

1978).

WOMEN INTHE MUSLIM WORLD 1, 27-28 (Lois Beck & Nikki Keddie eds.,
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obstacles. These obstacles will serve as impediments to the
progression of both the disputed and non-disputed provisions of
the Platform toward international norms.

V.

CONCLUSION

Most of the Catholic countries, but particularly the Vatican,
maintained a high profile at the Conference because of their
active lobbying against certain provisions. The international
press devoted much attention to the activities of the Vatican in
particular. However, the Islamic countries ultimately did the
most damage to positive consensus on the disputed provisions of
the Platform. Because of the existence of this unified and highly
interested group of states opposing these provisions, the potential
norms that could spring from those provisions are not likely to
move forward toward status as international human rights norms
in the near future. Most provisions of the Platform, though, were
subject to full support, and any potential norms springing from
those provisions have the potential to move into customary
international law on the basis of their endorsement in this
international forum. However, it remains to be seen whether
state practice at the domestic level will actually reflect and
reinforce the consensus achieved for those norms at the
Conference.
Without additional support from domestic implementation,
the potential norms born from the Conference will almost
certainly not develop into law. However, if states honor their
commitment to the Platform by implementing its objectives, the
Conference will have made important progress toward the
betterment of women worldwide.
Valerle A. Dormady

